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 In this chapter, I defend a novel account of contempt’s evaluative presentation by 
synthesizing relevant psychological work (Rozin et al. 1999; Fischer and Roseman 2007; 
Fischer 2011; Hutcherson and Gross 2011) with philosophical insights (Mason 2003; Bell 
2005; Abramson 2009; Bell 2013). I then show how a concern about contempt’s status as an 
emotion involved in holding people accountable can be helpfully addressed. Finally, I gesture 
at an account of why, when we feel contemptuous toward people, our accountability 
responses involve withdrawal and exclusion rather than approach and confrontation.  
 
1. Background Theory of Emotions 
Before I say more about contempt, I want to lay out my general theoretical approach 
to emotions. I view emotions as having multiple functions, including, at least evaluation, 
communication, and motivation (Cogley 2014). Emotions evaluate, or appraise, our environment 
in various ways (Parkinson 1997). For example, fear appraises our situation as dangerous; 
resentment appraises someone else’s conduct as wrong. Emotions also communicate to 
others—via characteristic facial expressions (Ekman 1999), speech patterns (Scherer 1986; 
Scherer et al. 1991), and bodily movements (Wallbott 1998)—that we have appraised our 
environment (and sometimes persons) in relevant ways and that we are therefore more likely 
to take certain kinds of actions than others. Resentment’s characteristic communication 
might be a request that another see himself as a wrongdoer (Macnamara 2013b), a demand 
that the target acknowledge fault (Darwall 2006), or both. Finally, emotions have 
motivational effects. For example, resentment characteristically motivates people to confront 
or approach the target of their emotion to try to change their situation (Harmon-Jones and 
Harmon-Jones 2007; Baumeister and Bushman 2007).1 
 On my view, emotions are functional psychological processes designed to bring us 
from an initial evaluation of our environment to then communicating that evaluation to 
others and motivating characteristic kinds of actions.2 Emotions thus have a mind-to-world 
direction of fit: they are representations/evaluations of the world as being a certain 
way/being good or bad in various respects. They also have world-to-mind direction of fit: 
they represent/evaluate how the world should be. (The communicative function may play a 
                                                
1 Aggression and attack are often presented as the typical motivational profile of anger. But 
psychological research suggests that while some individuals certainly do aggress or attack 
because of anger these are not universal motivational tendencies. For discussion, see (Averill 
1982; Steffgen and Pfetsch 2007; Cogley 2014). 
2 Andrea Scarantino (2014) has recently defended a ‘Motivational Theory’ of emotion that 
has significant overlap with my view. Scarantino does not discuss communicative functions, 
though he discusses both evaluational and motivational ones. 
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role in both.) In Millikan’s (2004) terminology, they are pushmi-pullyu representations, 
representing both facts and goals at the same time. Put another way, the function of emotion 
is to take us from sets of discrete evaluative inputs to communicative and motivational 
tendencies that serve important goals related to the relevant inputs.3 Below, I will argue that 
contempt’s function is to take us from an evaluation of a person as failing at a socially salient 
role to communicating to her that she has been evaluated in that way and motivating us to 
withdraw from her or ostracize her.  
 
2. Contempt is not Disgust, Resentment, or Hatred 
Let me introduce one more set of distinctions before turning directly to focus on 
contempt. Contempt is a discrete emotion from disgust and resentment.4 Disgust arguably 
has two types (Kelly 2011). One functions to take us from evaluations of our environment as 
being physically contaminating to an action tendency of oral ejection. The other takes us 
from evaluations of persons/situations as being impure to an action tendency of social 
rejection. Resentment, as noted above, takes us from evaluations of wrongness to the action 
tendency of confrontation. I view hatred, by contrast, as a kind of resentment at a person 
where the relevant action tendencies are to destroy or eliminate her.5 Contempt serves a 
different function than these other emotions. 
 
3. Paradigm Cases 
Consider three paradigm cases. In the first, my father plays bridge with some of the 
regulars at his local senior center. One of the players is a novice—a “tyro,” as he put it—
who thinks she’s an excellent player. When players are betting on how many tricks they will 
take, she consistently bids up the contract higher than she and her partner have any chance 
of going. For my father, this completely ruins the game. There’s no suspense or strategy in 
many of the rounds she plays. He attempts to sit in foursomes where she won’t be included, 
but players are typically rotated throughout the day so he can’t consistently avoid her. When 
he relayed this to me, his face showed clear disdain.  
Michelle Mason (2003) adapts a situation from the movie Le Mėpris to provide 
another archetype of contempt. Paul’s wife, Camille, comes to have contempt for him 
because of his treatment of her. Paul has been approached by a film producer, Prokosh, to 
write a screenplay. It becomes clear that Prokosh’s offer is a thinly veiled attempt to seduce 
Camille. Shockingly, Paul is an active facilitator of Prokosh’s aims: he encourages Camille 
against her wishes to ride alone with Prokosh in his 2-seat sports car to Prokosh’s chalet 
while Paul rides separately in a cab; he delays his arrival long enough that the film suggests a 
                                                
3 “Human smiles and frowns that are not yet overlaid with conscious intentions are simple 
[pushmi-pullyu’s], telling that something potentially rewarding has just been done and to 
keep doing it or do it again, or telling that something potentially damaging has just been 
done and to stop doing it or not do it again” (Millikan 2004, 157–58). I claim that emotions 
themselves, not just their common facial signs, have this function.  
4 Jesse Prinz suggests that contempt may be a blend of disgust and anger (2004). But he 
additionally holds that a blended meotion can come to represent something distinct from 
either of the basic emotions from which it is constructed. So in this sense, contempt may be 
importantly distinct from the primitives (Prinz 2004, 146–47), meaning it can be regarded as 
a discrete emotion. 
5 See (Bell 2013, 51–58) for a more careful defense of these claims. 
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seduction. Camille then becomes distant from Paul: she shuns his entreaties and generally 
withdraws from him, refusing to explain herself even when pressed.6  
Finally, Macalester Bell provides this example: in 2011, political revolution had 
already come to Tunisia and Egyptian protesters were demanding the same for their country, 
including free and fair elections and the resignation of the President, Hosni Mubarak. During 
the height of the protests, it was announced that Mubarak would address the nation. Rumors 
suggested that in the speech he would step down, but instead he avowed his intent to 
continue to rule, declaring that Egypt “will remain a country dear to my heart. It will not part 
with me and I will not part with it until my passing.”7 In response, many in the crowd waved 
their shoes in the air, a clear gesture of contempt in many parts of the world.  
 
4. Characteristic Evaluation 
Contempt, like all emotions, has a characteristic evaluative presentation, a way in which 
the emotion presents the world.8 Contempt’s evaluative presentation is of a person who has 
failed in a socially salient role. In the above examples, my father evaluates the tyro as an 
unacceptable bridge player. A minimally acceptable bridge player calibrates her betting with her 
abilities. Camille construes Paul as not much of a husband. A decent husband doesn’t 
prostitute sexual favors from his wife to advance his career. The Egyptian citizens think 
Mubarak is no President. A truly democratic leader is at least somewhat responsive to the will 
of the people.  
Another way to express the idea that contempt focuses on social role violations or 
failures is to appeal to the idea of a role baseline: the standards defining when one counts as a 
minimally acceptable bridge player, husband, president, and so on.9 These social roles are all 
defined by normative standards of some sort. To actually play bridge, one must follow a 
certain amount of the rules of the game, including implicit ones like how to bet. To be 
someone’s husband in a more than legal sense requires, in many people’s normative 
conception, that you must not be indifferent to whether your wife has sex with other people. 
And to be a president—the head of a republican state—means that you must listen to the 
demands of the populace. Someone with the title “President” who never cares about the 
views of the citizens holds that office in name, only. He has fallen below the role baseline.  
  
5. Characteristic Motivations and Communications 
                                                
6 Neither Mason nor myself are attempting to offer a full, nuanced picture of the arc of the 
film. I mean to portray Paul as willingly prostituting his wife for financial/artistic gain. 
7 I take the discussion of Mubarak and the quotation from (Bell 2013, 7–8). 
8 Evaluative presentations can be accurate or inaccurate—if a snake is venomous, for 
example, fear is accurate. If it’s just a rubber toy, fear is not. They can also be supported by 
good reasons, or not. When you become resentful at perceived wrongdoing based on scanty 
evidence, your resentment is not well-grounded. 
9 I draw the idea of the baseline from Bell’s discussion of the concept, which is ultimately 
due to (Ben-Ze’ev 2001). I depart somewhat from Bell’s conception, however, which ties the 
idea to the contemnor’s psychological framework in the sense that “one’s personal baseline 
demarcates who one would not stoop to be” (Bell 2013, 39 n. 46). I think, instead, that you 
can feel contempt toward someone based on their failure to live up to a minimal standard 
for a normatively defined social role that you will never consider occupying. I discuss this 
point further, below.  
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The examples above involve people evaluating others and in response trying not to 
associate with them and rejecting their affiliative appeals. My father tries to avoid the novice 
bridge player, Camille spurns Paul’s supplications, and the protestors scorn Mubarak’s 
intention to remain in power. Psychological evidence suggests these are typical contempt 
responses. Frijda (1986) holds that contempt is an attitude of indifference toward, or an 
active rejection of, someone or something. Roseman et al. found that contemptuous people, 
“felt like rejecting and not associating with someone, and wanted to be far away from and 
unlike someone” (1994, 212). Famously, contempt is one of the best predictors of divorce 
(Gottman 1998; Gottman and Levenson 2002). Fischer and Roseman (2007) adduce 
evidence that, in comparison to anger, someone feeling contempt is more likely to try to 
socially exclude the target. As they put it, “the social function of contempt is to move this 
person away from oneself and to ban him or her from one’s social environment” (2007, 
112). Philosophers concur with the psychological evidence, holding that contempt motivates 
avoidance and withdrawal (Mason 2003; Bell 2005; Abramson 2009; Bell 2013). 
While it is thought that contempt has a characteristic facial expression (Ekman and 
Friesen 1986; Matsumoto and Ekman 2004)—the raising of the corner of one lip, or 
‘sneering’—experimental subjects are not always able to easily categorize this display as 
contempt (Haidt and Keltner 1999). One reason for this may be that ‘contempt,’ unlike for 
example ‘anger,’ is not used nearly as often in common, current use. A search in Google 
Books finds that for books published in 2000, ‘anger’ is used about three times as often as 
‘contempt’ (“Google Ngram Viewer” 2016).10 Interestingly, however, non-linguistic 
emotional vocalizations of contempt are better apprehended than either facial or speech 
vocalizations (Hawk et al. 2009). 
 
6. Affinities with Other Accounts 
My idea that contempt is concerned with social role norm violations is indebted to 
the prior work of several parties. Paul Rozin, Laura Lowery, Sumio Imada, and Jonathan 
Haidt conducted experiments that show contempt more commonly elicited than anger and 
disgust by violations of communal codes: an employee directly criticizes her boss, a cleaner 
sits in the chair of the company president, a company executive refuses to sit next to a 
laborer on a train (1999). Rozin et al note that contempt, anger, and disgust all involve 
disapproval (Izard 1977), but that the kind of disapproval characteristic of each emotion is 
distinct. Drawing on the work of (Shweder et al. 1997) on different moral codes, they argue 
that anger is concerned with wrongs like rights violations or infringements of someone’s 
freedom, disgust with violations of purity and divinity norms, and contempt with community 
and hierarchy violations. On their model, when you consider whether an act is contemptible, 
“you think about things like duty, role-obligation, respect for authority, loyalty, group honor, 
interdependence, and the preservation of the community” (Rozin et al. 1999, 575–76). I 
claim that the idea of a normatively defined social role links all of these disparate concepts 
together. You count as loyal/disloyal, appropriately respectful/rude to authority, or 
honorable/dishonorable in reference to a normatively defined social role that you are 
construed as occupying. Importantly, however, you are only seen as violating the relevant 
communal, hierarchal norms—and so viewed as contemptable—if your social role requires 
that you adhere to them in a particular context. For example, etiquette is a communal code 
that requires of hosts that they make others welcome in various ways. But you don’t violate 
                                                
10 In the period 1770-1910, contempt was the most common of the four emotion terms 
‘anger,’ contempt,’ disdain,’ ‘resentment.’ 
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the norms of etiquette if you fail to offer a drink to your partner when she arrives home at 
the end of the day, though etiquette generally requires that for guests at parties. There are 
many communal codes that, depending on the social role you occupy and the context of the 
situation, you can contravene without being worthy of contempt. 
My view also bears important similarities to Michelle Mason’s (2003, 240–41) 
account. As I read Mason, she holds that contempt’s implicit normative standards are for 
persons, generally. In my view, this is too wide of a focus for many instances of contempt. 
Mason takes Camille’s contempt to be of Paul as a person. Instead, I take Camille to be 
contemptuous of Paul as a husband, or perhaps of him as a man.12 My view also has significant 
affinities with Kate Abramson’s understanding of contempt’s presentation as of someone 
violating “legitimate moral demands made of her within the context of our interaction” 
(2009, 207), though I don’t think the demands in question need to be moral in the sense that 
they serve to protect our well-being. A mixed-martial arts fighter, for example, might hold 
her opponent in contempt because her foe showed mercy. My account of contempt’s 
evaluative presentation also bears significant debt to Macalester Bell’s work (2005, 2013). On 
Bell’s view, contempt presents its target as failing to meet some standard that the contemnor 
endorses (2013, 37). I am claiming that the relevant standards are provided by normatively 
defined social roles. Further, I endorse Bell’s claim that contempt construes the target as 
falling below a relevant baseline. 
There are two ways in which someone can fail to meet the baseline of a normatively 
defined social role. He can be incompetent in a way that indicates lack of ability to fulfill the 
requirements of the role, as in the novice bridge player.13 I construe the bridge player as 
lacking a basic grasp of bridge strategy and possessing unwarranted confidence in the cards 
she is dealt. That, coupled with her inability to see her losses as due to anything other than 
bad luck, means she doesn’t understand her failures and lacks motivation to improve. 
Another way not to meet the baseline is to be intransigent about the role’s requirements, or 
ill willed about them, as in Mubarak’s case. Mubarak likely feels contempt for the citizens of 
Egypt. He thinks they have dishonorably protested against him, the entitled ruler, and he 
must overawe them into proper submission. 
Agneta Fischer and Roger Giner-Sorella’s model of contempt supports the idea that 
in many cases, successive actions are required to demonstrate incompetence or intransigence 
in role performance (as in the examples above). But in some cases, at least, a one-off 
performance is construed as enough (forthcoming, 15–16). We can see this in the disdain 
shown by basketball fans toward players who shoot air-balls. For professional players, in 
particular, the minimum standard is to hit at least some part of the rim or backboard. Failing 
to do that even once in a game generates a contemptuous response from the crowd. The 
eye-rolling response of a teenager when her mother makes an ignorant social gaffe provides 
another example: “did you know Demi Lovato and the Jonas Brothers know each other?” 
The teen sees her mother as so hopelessly out of touch with the relevant subtleties there 
would be no point in even trying to explain the problem.  
Whether the performance is one-off or a series, the relevant thing demonstrated is 
that the person’s character makes her unfit for the role in question (for concurrance see 
                                                
12 Mason originally suggests that Camille might be contemptuous of Paul for not being 
enough of a man, but then seems to endorse the idea that contempt is concerned with 
normative standards for persons, in general. 
13 For evidence that appraisals of incompetence are strongly predictive of contempt (rather 
than anger or disgust) see (Hutcherson and Gross 2011). 
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Mason 2003, 250). By character, I mean the psychological traits, capacities, and tendencies that 
reliably cause the target of contempt to act in various ways.14 In the bridge player example, 
my father evaluates the tyro as misunderstanding both the amount to bet and her own 
relative strength as a player. Her foolish inexperience is the target of his contempt. Camille’s 
contempt of Paul construes him as uncaring for her as his spouse, given that he is willing to 
prostitute her in return for personal gain. Mubarak’s prideful entitlement is what makes him 
an unsuitable holder of the presidency and thus worthy of contempt.  
 
7. Points of Contention 
Above, I canvassed significant similarities between my account of contempt’s 
evaluative presentation and the work of others. Here I want to explore some areas of 
disagreement. First, Bell claims that contempt is what she terms a globalist emotion which 
takes whole persons as its object.15 One way to see the point is that while we do get angry 
with other persons, we get angry with them for what they have done. For Bell, we feel contempt 
not for just a few of the person’s characteristics, but for all of her. I want to agree with Bell 
that contempt is about stable aspects of persons that make them unfit for the relevant social 
roles—their character traits.16 When the parent’s single social blunder is enough to bring 
forth the teen’s contempt, the contempt focuses on the fact that the parent’s blunder 
shows—from the teen’s perspective—serious social misunderstanding. But I don’t find 
reason to think the teen’s contempt construes the parent as falling below all relevant role-
standards (see Abramson 2009, 199–200 for concurrence). Many teens seek their parents’ 
guidance about academic manners while they never do the same about musical groups. At 
the moment we feel contempt for another person, we’re not typically trotting out her 
contrasting virtues at the same time. But this shouldn’t lead us to infer that contempt 
necessarily evaluates every aspect of the contemned person negatively. Here’s another case 
to further press the point.  
Imagine that in the course of your new faculty orientation you meet another faculty 
member also just starting at the university. She’s at the same career point as you and very 
congenial; you immediately hit it off. You quickly develop a friendship and see each other 
socially. When it’s getting close to your first-year review, it occurs to you both that you need 
peer teaching evaluations and so you each volunteer to sit in on the class of the other. 
Unfortunately, however, your friendly colleague’s teaching is the worst you’ve ever seen. 
While your friend can talk sensibly one-to-one, it seems her ability to think and talk clearly 
dissolves when teaching. Every attempt at clarity is a more confusing mess of jargon and 
contrasting claims. It’s clear from the students’ reactions that this is the norm for the course. 
You can’t help but feel contempt for your friend’s teaching. This, of course, may cause 
problems in your relationship (just wait until you have to write the peer teaching letter!) but I 
                                                
14 Even those like (Doris 2002) who hold that we lack character traits that predict behavior 
in many different circumstances allow that we possess local traits that reliably predict 
behavior in similar types of circumstance. Note also that these traits might or might not be 
changeable, or under the person’s control. Contempt isn’t concerned with whether failures 
of understanding, lacks of care, or hubris are mutable.  
15 Mason thinks that contempt typically has this whole person-focus, but does not hold that 
it always must (2003, 246–47).  
16 For related empirical discussion of how differing causal attributions—stable, general 
features of the target vs. unstable, specific features—lead to different emotions, see (Tracy 
and Robins 2004). 
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see no reason to assume that your contempt for your friend as a teacher construes the rest of 
her as bad. It’s not that you never again want to see her socially. You just want to never 
again sit in her class.  
Another point of contention between my account of contempt’s evaluative 
presentation and Bell’s concerns whether in feeling contempt the contemnor necessarily sees 
herself as superior to the person contemned, who is construed as inferior. Bell holds that 
contempt requires the comparison occur, while I don’t.17 (I do allow that it can be involved.) 
Bell calls this contempt’s comparative or reflexive element and notes that both David Hume 
(2007) and William Ian Miller (1998) agree. It seems to me, though, that Bell herself provides 
an example that disproves this claim. She considers an alcoholic who feels contempt for 
alcoholics, including himself. She says, “the contemnor may have contempt for himself and 
for others who fail to meet his personal baseline; such a person sees these others as his 
inferior equals” (2013, 43). What I think this example shows is that the alcoholic views 
himself and other alcoholics as following below the baseline for responsible alcohol 
consumption. But I don’t see how he can at the same time view himself as superior to 
himself or, alternatively, view the others as inferior to himself and himself their equal—
either of which seems required on Bell’s account. Or, at least, I don’t see why we need to 
attribute these unusual attitudes to the alcoholic in order to make sense of his contempt.  
It might be thought that my account of contempt’s evaluative presentation is too 
narrow in focusing on role norms. Many see contempt as simply occurring in response to a 
person’s dishonesty, irrationality, or general disregard of some social group (Mason 2003; 
Abramson 2009; Bell 2013). At least on first look, these contempt responses don’t appear 
connected to a role-violation. In reply, I point out that dishonesty, irrationality, and even 
disregard of some groups is thought admirable in some contexts and does not prompt 
contempt. The robber doesn’t contemn the effective lies of his accomplice, I enjoy the 
intriguing irrationality of my unusual friend, and we at least sometimes applaud distain 
directed toward those worthy of derision. What determines when a person’s dishonestly, 
irrationality, or disregard cause an observer’s contempt and when they don’t? Whether the 
observer construes the person as occupying a norm-governed social role, I predict. 
Importantly, as alluded to by (Rozin et al. 1999), there are a wide variety of social roles that 
humans may occupy. Some roles and their norms are highly specific— “friend to my best 
friend” — while others are far more general — “productive member of society.” My 
empirical hypothesis is that social roles and norms play a central role in determining when 
contempt is elicited and when it is not. 
Finally, I want to highlight one final point of contention between my construal of 
contempt’s evaluative presentation and some others. On my view, contempt construes a 
person as demonstrating failure in a social role relative to a normatively defined role baseline 
because she has a flawed character. Some commentators deny that contempt’s evaluative 
presentation implies anything at all about the target’s character. They take contempt’s 
evaluative presentation to be simply that the other lacks relevant social status. As Bell puts it, 
“the object of contempt may simply lack the appropriate status in the judgement of the 
                                                
17 Mason takes my side: “we best understand contempt as presenting its object [as] falling 
short of some legitimate interpersonal idea of the person, one the contemnor endorses if not 
one that she herself succeeds in meeting” (2003, 241). She continues, “we need not assume 
that a contemnor […] looks down upon her target in virtue of herself being superior in the 
relevant respect; to do so would make self-contempt a conceptual impossibility” (Mason 
2003, 241n.15). 
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contemptuous” (2005, 83). And further, “In some cases, simply having a certain quality will 
be enough to count as failing to meet the ideal in question” (Bell 2005, 92n.3). Even Kate 
Abramson, who appears generally unsympathetic to this aspect of Bell’s position, says that, 
“contempt commonly takes for its object those vices which cannot be understood apart from 
their tie to morally prohibited conduct, and is often understood as an appropriate attitude 
only insofar as there is such a tie” (Abramson 2009, 206, emphasis added). Abramson thus 
seems to allow that some forms of contempt do not presuppose any conceptual tie to a 
person’s morally prohibited conduct or flawed character.  
I want to make several points in defending the claim that contempt’s evaluative 
presentation necessarily contains a characterological focus. First, many psychologists take 
contempt to typically be caused by events where the contemnor blames the other for what 
she did (Hutcherson and Gross 2011; Fischer and Giner-Sorolla forthcoming); some studies 
find that contempt is associated with even more blame than anger (Fischer and Roseman 
2007). Of course, the psychological studies are probing the characteristic causes of 
contempt, not directly investigating its evaluative presentation. Still, if we assume that our 
moral theorizing about human emotions should be constrained by how humans actually 
respond to one another, these results suggest that contempt’s evaluative presentation 
includes something for which the person can legitimately be blamed, such as the person’s 
character. Second, cases of contempt where it might initially appear there is no 
characterological focus are better interpreted as possessing one. Bell notes that, “a racist may 
hold people of color in contempt, not because of anything the targets have done of anything 
he thinks they have done, but simply in virtue of their race” (2013, 38). I suggest that even in 
these cases contempt has a characterological focus. Psychologists have found that 
dehumanization—one of the core mechanisms in racism—is associated with either seeing 
members of another group as more like machines (unfeeling doers) or animals (unthinking 
feelers) than inter-group members (Haslam 2006; Wegner and Gray 2016 Ch. 5). In either 
case, the contemptuous view of another group is associated with different views of their 
character. 
We can validate a chracterological focus for contempt while at the same time 
recognizing that it makes sense to call the responses of the racist contemptuous by invoking 
the notion of what Agneta Fischer and Roger Giner-Sorella term a sentiment: an emotional 
response caused by a long-term stereotype of an individual or group, rather than to an 
immediate reaction to an event (N. H. Frijda 1993; Fischer and Giner-Sorolla forthcoming). 
Arguably, a sentiment is formed by consistent patterns of emotional response to a common 
object (or similar objects) with particular properties. For example, (Ufkes et al. 2012) find 
that a stereotype of a group as less competent leads to increased feelings of contempt and 
increased tendencies to avoid members of that group. The racist’s sterotype might be a hasty 
generalization from one member of a group that she sees as incompetent, which leads her to 
feel contemputous of other group members who she then infers are similarly incompotent. 
She infers the presumed incompetent character of the group members from their surface 
properties.18 Of course, she may well have no relevant experiences with those in the relevant 
group and may infer the incompetent character of people of other races by observing the 
contemptuous responses of other racists. But part of what makes racist contempt inaccurate 
is that it presumes, incorrectly, the flawed character of those it targets.  
                                                
18 By compairison, note that humans sponteneously infer mental states that lead to harmful 
acts even when we have no evidence about the mental state in question (Young and Tsoi 
2013). 
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If I interpret Bell’s view of contempt correctly, it is hard to make out the error in the 
contemptuous response some people of higher status have to those with lower social status. 
It is true that many targets of race-based contempt are contemned for a characteristic—their 
race—which should have no bearing on their social status (Bell 2013, 216). But sometimes 
people are contemned in ways that do relate to appropriate social status gradations. Consider 
a teaching assistant who correctly sees herself as having a higher social status than her 
undergraduates and therefore feels contempt toward them. Bell is surely right that if the TA 
attempts to exact deference from her students, she demonstrates a vice (2013, 109). But 
what if the TA doesn’t demand reverence, instead confining her contempt to those lonely 
moments when she has to read student papers? If employment as a TA and her training in 
higher education are appropriate grounds of higher social status, then it would appear on 
Bell’s account that the TA’s contempt for her undergradutes is accurate.  
I think we should reject this conclusion and should also reject that it is fitting for a 
TA to contemn her students. We can do both by noting that the proper role relationship 
between the TA and students is one that assumes that the students know and understand 
less than the TA. Thus, in this context, their lack of understanding isn’t a character flaw, it is 
just what is expected of them. If they are doing what their role demands, they certainly 
haven’t violated it. Thus, the TA’s contempt is inaccurate. 
 
8. Moral Concerns about Contempt 
In this section, I want to briefly consider two common moral objections to contempt 
before responding at greater length to a third. The first worry about contempt is that it 
always misrepresents its target due to its globalism: it takes whole persons as its object (Doris 
2002). I deny that contempt does so. People are rarely contemptible in every respect, nor 
does contempt claim otherwise.19 Another related concern is that contempt violates people’s 
basic claim of respect against others (Kant 1797; Hill 2000) because it construes people as 
lacking dignity. Again, I deny that contempt plays this role. Contempt claims people are 
failing to adequately perform their role in a socially salient domain. This is, no doubt, an 
uncomfortable truth to realize, but it is not disrespectful when it is accurate.  
One concern has not been addressed: whether feeling contempt for someone is a 
way of morally addressing them or holding them accountable. Consider, for example, a non-
accountability response like fear. If your actions pose a danger to me and I become fearful, 
my fear evaluates your conduct as bad for me. But my fear doesn’t thereby seek a response 
from you. If anything, my fear seeks that I respond by fleeing. By contrast, we hold one 
another accountable when we blame people via the emotions of anger, resentment, and 
indignation and also behave toward them in associated ways. Becoming angry at you because 
of your frightening actions would be a way of holding you accountable and demanding a 
response: that you feel guilty, apologize, and make amends (Cogley 2013a, 2013b; 
Macnamara 2013a; Darwall 2006; Hieronymi 2001). Typically, when we are angry at 
someone we approach them and confront them over what they’ve done, thereby holding 
them accountable for their conduct. Thus, part of the reason for understanding resentment 
as an accountability response relates to its typical motivational tendencies. By contrast, 
Brenden Dill and Stephen Darwall claim that,  
                                                
19 Bell’s commitment to globalism means she must defend the idea that globalist contempt 
can be accurate: (2013, 78–89, 2010, 2008). 
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When a noble looks down on a serf with contempt, he hardly aims to have 
the serf hold himself accountable for his contemptible state. The emotion 
that responds to contempt is not guilt, but shame, which, as we have noted, 
shows itself in very different ways than guilt does. (2014, 70) 
Dill and Darwall’s claim is buttressed by the characteristic motivational and communicative 
tendencies of contempt: avoidance and withdrawal. A theorist who wants to defend 
contempt as an emotion connected to accountability needs to show why contempt counts as 
a way of holding responsible and fear does not, though both emotions share some similar 
motivational tendencies. 
 Why does it matter whether contempt is a way of holding people accountable? 
Responses that hold people accountable engage with people’s agency. Resentment has two 
motivational components (Dill and Darwall 2014, 45). One is a forward-looking 
commitment to holding others to the demand that they not do wrong. The other is a 
backward-looking commitment to holding people accountable via blame and punishment 
when they have already done something wrong. While neither of these responses is 
enjoyable for the target, both count as ways of respecting them as people who are 
responsible for their choices. By contrast, being afraid of a person’s behavior doesn’t involve 
issuing a demand or making a claim. The person is simply taken to be dangerous and 
therefore to be avoided. The person feeling fear is not seeking a response from the person 
feared. If we are to legitimate contempt’s claim to be a moral response that respects others, 
we need to show how it is a way of addressing people or holding them accountable.  
 One potential line of response is broached by Bell, who notes that it is possible to 
give contempt uptake, that is, to receive the message contained in contempt. Feeling guilty 
gives uptake to resentment because guilt’s message, “I’ve done wrong,” acknowledges the 
message contained in resentment: “You’ve done wrong.” Bell points out that if someone is 
the target of contempt and believes the contempt is accurate, he will respond with shame 
(Bell 2013, 187). But this isn’t enough to fully address Dill and Darwall’s concern. The fact 
that there is a matched response doesn’t show that the response is an accountability 
response. If I fear you, you may be appropriately horrified that I’ve seen you as dangerous. 
Or if you’re disgusted by me, I might respond with fitting embarrassment. Bell notes that 
feeling disgusted shouldn’t be construed as seeking a response, as any response from a thing 
evaluated as disgusting would be unwelcome (Bell 2013, 186). So not just any response will 
do—an accountability response has to be a response by the target that is, in some sense, 
sought by the person feeling contempt.  
 Kate Abramson gives an alternative reply to this concern. On her view, some forms 
of contempt are ‘moralized’ in the sense that the contempt is conceptually tied to 
characterological traits, like dishonesty, that generate morally improper conduct. Contempt 
that is moralized in this way then represents the person as to be avoided in a particular area 
of social interaction. This means that the person feeling contemptuous must thereby adopt 
the standpoint of someone who could have had those social interactions (Abramson 2009, 
208). Again, this doesn’t fully address Dill and Darwall’s concern. The fact that someone’s 
contempt for a dishonest person requires that the contemnor think of the other as a potential 
friend or authority figure doesn’t show how the contemnor actually takes herself to have any 
actual relationship with the person contemned. Further, it doesn’t show how the person is 
then rejected by the contemnor’s refusal to engage the target in the first place.  
 To begin my own response to the concern raised by Dill and Darwall, consider a 
professor from another department you hold in contempt. You’ve never even been 
introduced; your contempt stems from reports from students and other faculty about his 
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behavior. You do see him at Academic Senate occasionally, however, and there you avoid 
him, refuse to meet his eyes, and generally stay disengaged. How does your refusal to engage 
with him address him? Answering this requires noting a background assumption of human 
sociality that applies to many of our interactions with each other. Humans are profoundly 
social creatures and our ‘default’ setting, as it were, appears to be to engage with others 
rather than disengage. Not only do we often acknowledge strangers on the street, but 
soldiers otherwise engaged in battle will move toward fraternization in some contexts 
(Ashworth 2000). Of course, there are other contexts, like the busy streets of Manhattan, 
where the background sociality assumption isn’t in place. But when it is in place, failure to 
engage sends a message to the contemned person that they aren’t worthy of social 
engagement. And someone is thought not be worthy of social engagement just in case they 
are failing at a socially salient role.  
 There’s a notable connection here to Christopher Bennett’s views on the nature of 
blame. Bennett imagines a man named Bryson who arrives at work one day and finds that 
none of his colleagues will look at him or otherwise engage with him (2002). Bryson calls out 
a greeting; no one responds. He settles into his seat at work, flummoxed by their continued 
silence. Slowly he realizes that they must know about his ongoing affair. He’s been cheating 
on his long-term partner and the woman with whom he’s trysting knows some of his office-
mates. Bennett’s discussion revolves around the way that Bryson is alienated from his 
colleagues by his behavior and how their avoidant response is a common way of expressing 
blame. What interests me about the example is that it is immediately intelligible as blame and, 
while Bennett presents the colleagues as being angry with Bryson, they are at least as readily 
interpreted as contemptuous of him because they explicitly don’t follow the basic sociality 
assumption in their interactions with Bryson.  
 Finally, let’s return to the noble and serf in Dill and Darwall’s example. One way of 
interpreting the situation is that the noble simply regards the serf as not worth noticing, but 
this is a nonemotional response akin to dispassionately judging that someone has done 
something wrong. It’s not the relevant case. The pertinent example is where the noble 
actually feels contempt for the serf. I submit that in such a case the noble regards the serf as 
failing as a serf. That is, the noble regards the serf as failing to adequately venerate the noble 
so that the serf becomes noticeable, rather than not noticed. So the noble’s contempt 
addresses the serf as failing at the serf’s socially salient role, which is, again, the evaluative 
content I attribute to contempt.  
 
9. Why Withdrawal and Disengagement? 
So far, I’ve defended a novel interpretation of contempt’s evaluative presentation 
and also argued that it should rightfully be seen as an accountability response. In this section, 
I want to hypothesize about why contempt takes the specific response it does. Why would 
withdrawal or disengagement make more sense for a contemptuous person than approaching 
or confronting the target when the target is construed as failing in a social role? In other 
words, why not respond directly to the person failing, explicitly call them to account, and 
demand they act otherwise, instead of obliquely holding them accountable? Here are some 
tentative thoughts sparked by Kwame Anthony Appiah’s book, The Honor Code (Appiah 
2010). 
 In the book, Appiah argues that several moral revolutions—the eradication of 
dueling in England, the end of footbinding in China, and the collapse of the Transatlantic 
slave trade—were driven more by concerns about honor than by the force of the arguments 
against these practices. In each case, Appiah argues that a significant part of the concern that 
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led to the elimination of these practices was growing feelings of contempt for those who 
participated in them and correlate feelings of shame by the practitioners. Dueling became 
unfashionable, in part, when commoners took up the practice, which was shameful to the 
gentlemen who engaged in it. Footbinding fell out of favor when it became seen as a way in 
which China was ‘backward’ compared to the developing industrialized world. The slave 
trade crumbled after workers in Britain came to see slave labor as devaluing the work they 
themselves did, since slave labor was unpaid.  
  In all these cases, reform occurred when people’s social identities were under threat. 
I have argued that contempt presents someone as violating the terms of a normatively 
defined social role. If I’m right about contempt’s evaluative presentation, we can see why 
withdrawal and exclusion are the characteristic motivations, rather than approach and 
confrontation. Contempt tries to protect our social identities from harm by others, just as 
resentment tries to protect our persons from harm. Our social identities get meaning at least 
in part because of the fact that others share in those identities and help shape them. Being a 
gentleman was defined by what you did and what you were allowed to do, so once the norms 
and practices shifted to allow commoners to duel, gentlemen were forced to give up dueling 
or become more like commoners. They chose the higher status option. So did Chinese 
people who opposed footbinding and free laborers who opposed the slave trade. Being a 
professor is a higher status position because professors typically have more education and 
thus have a greater understanding of the material than laity. Your contempt for your 
incompetent colleague serves to both hold her responsible and to separate yourself from her 
so that her ineptitude doesn’t tarnish the presumed facility with the material and status that 
comes to you via your role.  
 For Appiah, honor involves norms or codes that define what a person of your 
identity should do and also allows you to share in the achievements of others whose identity 
you share (2010, 162). Our social identities and social achievements aren’t fully up to us 
because they require the participation of other people. What others do can be a threat to me 
and others in my group even if they don’t directly harm me or others I care about, because 
our social identities isn’t solely under our control.  
My father was a professor and editor; he suffered a massive stroke years ago and can 
no longer work at either vocation. Bridge is one of his stand-ins. I imagine my father’s 
contempt for the novice bride player stems, in part, from bridge having this role for him. 
Since he can’t do academic work or editing in a way he takes to be serious, a person who 
doesn’t take bridge seriously is a threat to an important part of his social identity. If he can’t 
convince the tyro to improve her betting and take the game seriously, his best option is to 
exclude her. Exclusion limits the danger to his social identity. I don’t have an account of 
exactly how our social identities are constructed such that our achievements and failures 
contribute to the honor and dishonor to those with whom we share identities. But that 
seems correct to me. My proposal is that taking that assumption on board helps us make 
better sense of contempt’s characteristic motivational patterns.  
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